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1. Introduction 
 
In the year 1996, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) established standards for how individually identifiable health 
information is received, maintained, and stored in electronic form for any given 
healthcare organization. In the year 2009, the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act also set standards, implementation 
specifications and other criteria for the maintenance of Electronic Health Records 
(EHR) [2]. At the time of HIPAA’s creation, the healthcare industry was 
transitioning from a paper based information system to an electronic information 
system. Health records were being transformed into a digital format, and the 
industry began to rely heavily on the use of electronic systems to conduct 
business [3]. Prior to HIPAA, there were no security or privacy rules defined for 
the protection of a patient’s electronic healthcare information. HIPAA created two 
important guidelines. The first rule, ‘the Security Rule’, warranted that entities 
(health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, healthcare providers who transmit any 
health information in electronic form) must ensure the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of all electronic protected health information (e-PHI) they create, 
receive, maintain or transmit. This includes identifying and protecting against 
reasonably anticipated threats to the security (or integrity) of the information, and 
protecting against reasonably anticipated, impermissible uses or disclosure while 
ensuring compliance by their workforce [4]. The second element created, ‘the 
Privacy Rule,’ assuring that the information maintained within one’s electronic 
health records are kept secret while flowing from one healthcare entity to another. 
More specifically, if a patient’s electronic health records are disclosed, the 
individually identifiable health information (i.e. a patient’s past, present or future 
physical or mental health) should not be associated with the individual [5]. 
 
Despite these efforts by the federal government, a survey by the Ponemon 
Institute in 2010-2011 found that there has been a severe lack of security 
countermeasures [6]. The Ponemon Institute found 60% of healthcare providers 
had severe critical security breaches in the past two years. Moreover, the average 
breach cost healthcare entities over $2 million each. The United States 
Department of Health and Human Services [7, 8] also discusses and identifies the 
increased trend of security breaches in this area. Furthermore, half of the 
healthcare entities that were interviewed revealed they had little faith in their 
information technology (IT) personnel to protect patient’s data. This report 
suggests an alarming situation and needs immediate attention by the industry. 
Efforts to learn from other IT fields on how to provide security and privacy 
measures have proven that there is a lack of completeness in the tool sets 
available to the healthcare industry.  
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Therefore, we aim to achieve four goals while developing our tool set: 
 
 Comprehensiveness: The tool set needs to be comprehensive enough to scan 
the entire domain of an information system. It not only needs to detect 
misconfiguration on servers (i.e. database servers, web servers, email servers, 
etc.) and network devices, and find missing patches on hosts, but it must also 
have the capability to detect vulnerabilities within new and upcoming services 
such as VOIP (e.g. eavesdropping) and virtual infrastructures (e.g. 
misconfigured virtual networks and virtual hosts). 
 
 Automation: Any comprehensive assessments take time to complete, and if an 
IT professional has to do one manually, it can take substantial time to 
complete the task. Moreover, a manual, comprehensive assessment of a 
Healthcare Information System (HIS) can be long and tedious. IT 
professionals performing the assessment may skip steps in the assessment to 
save time and resources. By automating a comprehensive assessment, 
healthcare IT professionals will save time and resources. Likewise, they will 
be confident in their assessment results. 
 
 Health IT Compliance: Our third objective is ensuring our derived assessment 
tool set will provide Health IT compliance in regards to ‘The Security’ and 
‘The Privacy’ rule. 
 
 Mitigation Strategies: Finally, we aim to achieve mitigation strategies with 
complete assessments. Our mitigation technique will differ from current 
techniques in that our strategy will be real-time and automated rather than 
offline and delayed.  
 
By integrating the above goals into our derived tool set, we aim to address the 
security and privacy concerns of healthcare entities and to restore faith in their 
electronic information systems. Hence to achieve the goals of this research we 
will do the following: 
 
 We will survey commercial and open source tools in the areas of 
networks, databases, applications, and infrastructure security. We will then 
identify the best-fit open source tools to be integrated into a tool set.  
 
 When the best-fit open source tools have been identified, we will then 
build the comprehensive, assessment tool set and modify it to meet federal 
compliance of security and privacy regulations in the healthcare industry. 
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 After all the applications have been installed, we will write scripts to 
automate the vulnerability assessment and penetration test for a typical 
HIS. 
 
 Finally, after the vulnerability and assessments have been completed, we 
will provide a real-time, automated analysis of the logs, and provide 
guidance on how to mitigate risk within the HIS.  
As the healthcare industry is rapidly moving towards electronic based 
information exchange, it has become mandatory for it to be compliant with the 
HIPAA, the HITECH Act, and other federal regulations and standards. This 
change towards electronic based information systems also requires the industry to 
maintain the privacy of patient information. Today’s healthcare industry has 
experienced numerous instances of breach of information and the loss or 
compromise of critical patient data. According to the Ponemon Research Study, 
92% of all healthcare institutions report they have experienced data breaches in 
recent years. If entities within this industry do not address this problem 
sufficiently, then it might lead to severe federal penalties along with patient 
privacy compromises and patient dissatisfaction.  
 
The remaining parts of this paper are split into eight more sections. First, we 
will discuss the research that is already being done in this field. Then we present 
our survey results from commercial vendors and open source organizations. In 
section four we will detail a risk assessment framework for the healthcare 
industry. Then we outline our evaluation environment and how we plan to 
evaluate our open source solution against a competitive commercial product. We 
will then present how our analysis and detection engine operates and how 
mitigation strategies are recommended. Finally, we will present the conclusion 
and future directions for this research.  
 
2. Background  
 
Over the years there has been a considerable growth in the availability of 
automated vulnerability assessment solutions to assess an organization’s 
information system. In fact, there are several solutions from commercial vendors 
that provide automated vulnerability and penetration testing software. Yet, none 
of these solutions offer industry specific compliance testing right out of the box. 
Most vendors require organizations to buy plug-ins in addition to their product to 
automate industry specific compliance testing.  
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Even though the area of automated assessment is quite mature, there is still a 
dearth of automated approached for assessment. However, two most current open 
source vulnerability assessments do meet some of the goals of our research. Those 
tools are OpenVAS 4 [10] from the OpenVAS organization and Fast-Track [15] 
from Offensive Security Ltd. Relating OpenVas 4 to our research; we see that it 
has a comprehensive scanner used to inspect remote hosts and attempts to list all 
the vulnerabilities and common misconfigurations that affect the host. This tool 
can be used to comprehensively scan a network as well as server configurations. 
Yet OpenVas 4 is not fully automated and does not scan a HIS right out of the 
box. A healthcare IT professional must configure the scanner to scan a HIS for 
HIPAA compliance. If the scanner is configured correctly (to scan for HIPAA 
compliance), then the OpenVAS 4 tool will ensure a HIS is acting in accordance 
with the Privacy and Security Rules set forth by HIPAA. Additionally, it can be 
configured to list the vulnerabilities associated with each device/service that it 
scans, but the tool cannot provide any mitigation strategies for the vulnerabilities 
found. Likewise, the tool Fast-Track is an automated penetration suite designed to 
scan and penetrate databases, networks, infrastructures, and applications on an 
information system's domain. However, this tool’s scanning capabilities is not as 
comprehensive as OpenVAS 4—it cannot scan wireless networks or VOIP 
infrastructures. Similar to OpenVas 4, the tool does not satisfy the Privacy and 
Security Rules defined by HIPAA. Additionally, Fast-Track does not list 
vulnerabilities detected or provide mitigation strategies after it has finished its 
assessment. 
 
There are numerous policy guidelines on how to keep healthcare entities 
HIPAA compliant, but there is a lack of implementation solutions (tool sets) on 
how to provide compliance in practice. Additionally, there is little work, if any, in 
using an automated assessment tool set for finding vulnerabilities in a typical HIS 
and provide mitigation strategies.  
 
3. Survey of Tools 
 
In this section, we identify the tools and their capabilities in regards to assessing 
the four security areas of a HIS. These areas include Database Security, Network 
Security, Infrastructure Security, and Application Security. First, Database 
Security ensures that the designed tool set will be able to crawl, and/or use an 
SQL Injection attack on an EHR database to obtain information on patients (i.e. 
billing information, social security numbers, type of Healthcare insurance the 
patient has, etc.). The second area, Network Security means the tool set must be 
able to scan IP ranges of devices on a network and try to identify the operating 
system, manufacturer and model. Furthermore, it needs to provide the results from 
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the scanner(s) with minimal false positives, and offer exploits available from the 
scanner results. The third security area, Infrastructure Security implies that the 
tool set needs to deliver client side endpoint attacks to test the infrastructure 
(operating systems security and services reliability). Finally, for the fourth area, 
Application Security, the tool set must offer application testing in regards to 
endpoint attacks on applications (buffer overflows, cross site scripting attacks, 
etc.). Additionally, the derived tool set needs to be comprehensive enough to 
provide the capabilities for various types of assessments.  
 
The first assessment, External Network Vulnerability Assessment Testing, 
involves finding unknown vulnerabilities from outside a HIS’s network through 
poor network design and backdoors. One should not be able to access private 
areas of the HIS from outside the network. If there is a vulnerability detected, the 
tools set will try to penetrate the network in order to prove data can be accessed. 
The second assessment, Internal Network Vulnerability: Assessment Testing deals 
with finding unknown vulnerabilities from inside a HIS’s network. The tool set 
will assess the electronic assets (EHR database, application servers, file servers, 
web server, etc.) of the HIS, and if there is a vulnerability detected, the tool set 
will try to exploit the vulnerability in order to prove data can be accessed or a 
service can be degraded.  
 
The next assessment, Web Application Assessment Testing, ensures the tool 
set will test web applications by simulating attacks to gather information on their 
flaws and vulnerabilities. More specifically, the tool set will need to test for the 
following types of vulnerabilities (but not limited to): cross-site scripting, SQL 
injection, input validation, and buffer overflows. In the fourth assessment, Dial-
In/RAS Security Testing, the task includes testing dial-in/remote access entry point 
connections that employees or healthcare partners use and identifying exploits 
that can be used against the system. In the following assessment, DMZ or 
Network Architecture Designs/Reviews, the tool set will verify data stores are not 
located publicly or in the DMZ. Furthermore, an adversary should not be able to 
bypass the firewall by piggybacking off a connection from a mail server located 
outside the internal network.  
 
Wireless Network Assessment Testing incorporates the capability for the tool 
set to be comprehensive enough to detect misconfigurations in wireless access 
points and exploit them if vulnerabilities arise. Additionally, if enough packets are 
analyzed, the tool set will try to crack the WEP and WPA-PSK keys. In Virtual 
Infrastructure Security Assessments we see the tool set identifying and mitigating 
virtual infrastructure risk by checking the configurations of virtual machines, 
networks, and storage mediums. For the next capability, Server Configuration 
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Reviews, the tool set will review common network service misconfigurations, 
local password policies, file shares, and file share permissions. Firewall and 
Router Configuration Reviews ensures the tool set will check a HIS’s network 
perimeter to ensure each firewall is properly configured in order to allow verified 
network traffic into the HIS's network. In addition, VPN Configuration Reviews 
will verify a VPN is configured correctly and there are no vulnerable entries into 
the network. A hacker should not be able to view sensitive information flowing 
from location to another. Finally, for Voice over IP Assessments, the tool set will 
be analyzing a HIS's network to see if it is vulnerable to the following 
vulnerabilities: SIP-based phone call on eavesdropping, and SIP-based phone call 
hijacking.   
 
The results from our commercial tools surveys are detailed in the table 1-1 
and 1-2. Included in the table is how each vendor’s solution’s capabilities 
contribute to the goal of our research. In table 1-1, the commercial tools survey, 
we could infer that eEye Digital Security’s Retina Enterprise Edition is the best 
choice. We found Core Impact Pro was not a vulnerability scanner, but rather an 
automated penetration tester solution that records successful and unsuccessful 
attacks and generates vulnerability reports based on those penetration tests. 
Therefore, Core Impact Pro may miss a vulnerability that a vulnerability scanner 
may be able to detect. In addition, we discovered Retina Enterprise Edition could 
also perform penetration attacks using a built in hacker module [9]. Moreover, 
Retina and Core Impact Pro could be configured to assess for HIPAA compliance 
(Security & Privacy Rules); however, each vendor charges extra fees to provide 
this functionality.  
 
As far as the other tools in this survey, we found that they were not as 
comprehensive as Retina or Core Impact Pro. WebInspect is geared strictly to 
finding vulnerabilities in web applications; Foreground Security did not offer any 
products, but rather vulnerability assessment and penetration testing services. As 
far as SAINT, information was rather scarce. We did not find as much 
information on SAINT as with Retina. Comparing the two solutions we were 
more confident with Retina's Enterprise solution. Additionally, Retina's solution 
was the highest rated network vulnerability assessment scanners in the industry. 
Furthermore, our results from the open source survey are listed in table 1-2.   
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Tool Database Network Infrastructure Applications 
eEye Digital Network Scanner 
Retina Enterprise Edition 
 
eEye Retina Network security scanner 
identifies known and zero day 
vulnerabilities to protect an 
organization’s networked assets. The 
Retina Scanner supports security risk 
assessment and regulatory audits. 
http://www.eeye.com/home 
Database 
scanning 
External network 
vulnerability 
Assessment 
Internal network 
Assessments 
Wireless network 
assessments 
VOIP Assessments 
Network 
architecture 
Designs 
Firewall  
Configuration 
Reviews 
Server 
configuration 
reviews 
Virtual 
infrastructure 
security 
assessment  
Web application 
scanning  
HP WebInspect 
HP WebInspect performs Web 
application and Web service security 
testing and assessment of complex web 
applications. WebInspect also provides 
automated penetration tests. 
http://www8.hp.com/  
   Web application 
scanning 
Core Impact Enterprise Edition 
An automated security testing and 
measurement solution that can be used 
to continuously assess the security of an 
organization’s Web applications, 
networks, and client-side weaknesses. 
The product does not scan for potential 
vulnerabilities, monitor for incidents, or 
model threats. Instead it replicates real-
world attacks against systems and data, 
using the same offensive techniques that 
hackers employ to find and exploit 
weaknesses and expose critical data. 
http://www.coresecurity.com/ 
Database 
penetration 
testing 
External network 
penetration testing 
Internal network 
penetration testing 
Wireless network 
assessments 
VOIP Assessments 
Network 
architecture 
Designs 
 
 Web application 
scanning  
Nessus 
 
Tenable’s Nessus is an agentless, active 
vulnerability scanner that performs 
vulnerability scanning and analysis 
(including Web application scanning, 
via a plug-in), as well as compliance 
checking, asset discovery and profiling, 
configuration auditing, and sensitive 
data discovery. 
http://www.tenable.com/  
Database 
scanning 
External network 
vulnerability 
Assessment 
Internal network 
Assessments 
Wireless network 
assessments 
VOIP Assessments 
Network 
architecture 
Designs 
Firewall 
Configuration 
Reviews 
Server 
configuration 
reviews 
 
Virtual 
infrastructure 
security 
assessment 
Web 
Application 
Scanning 
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Tool Database Network Infrastructure Applications 
Saint Enterprise Edition 
 
A toolkit designed for vulnerability 
scanning, assessment, and validation on 
various targets including network 
devices, operating systems, databases, 
and desktop applications. The SAINT 
toolkit not only identifies vulnerabilities, 
but also ways to mitigate those 
vulnerabilities. In addition, the toolkit 
can exploit vulnerabilities to 
demonstrate the scope of damage done 
by vulnerability. 
http://www.saintcorporation.com/ 
Database 
penetration 
testing 
External network 
vulnerability 
Assessment 
Internal network 
Assessments 
Wireless network 
assessments 
VOIP Assessments 
Network 
architecture 
Designs 
 
Server 
configuration 
reviews 
Web application 
penetration 
testing 
 
Table 1-1 Commercial Tools Survey 
 
 
Database Network  Infrastructure Application 
Wapiti 
Wapiti is an open 
source and web-based 
tool that scans the web 
pages of the deployed 
web applications, 
looking for scripts and 
forms where it can 
inject data. It is built 
with Python and can 
detect: 
1) File handling errors 
2) Database, XSS, 
LDAP and CRLF 
injections. 
3) Command execution 
detection. 
This tool can be used to 
scan the databases as 
well scan web 
applications for 
vulnerabilities. 
http://wapiti.sourceforg
e.net/README 
OpenVAS 4 
OpenVAS Security Scanner 
is a security auditing tool 
made up of two parts: a 
scanner and a client. The 
scanner, openvassd is in 
charge of the attacks, while 
the client OpenVAS 
interfaces with the user. The 
scanner, the most critical 
part, inspects remote hosts 
and attempts to list all the 
vulnerabilities and common 
misconfigurations that affect 
the host. This tool can be 
used to scan the network as 
well as the server 
configurations 
(infrastructure) of an 
organizations health 
information system.  
 
http://www.openvas.org/src-
doc.html  
OpenVAS 4 OpenVAS 4 
SQLMap 
SQLMap is an open 
source penetration 
testing tool that 
automates the process 
of detecting and 
exploiting SQL 
Kismet 
Kismet is an 802.11 layer2 
wireless network detector, 
sniffer, and intrusion 
detection system. Kismet 
will work with any wireless 
card which supports raw 
 
Wapiti 
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injection flaws and 
taking over of back-end 
database servers. It 
comes with a broad 
range of features, from 
database fingerprinting 
to fetching data from 
the DB and even 
accessing the 
underlying file system 
and executing OS 
commands via out-of-
band connections. 
Needless to say this will 
aid in fingerprinting and 
exploiting a database. 
https://svn.sqlmap.org/s
qlmap/trunk/sqlmap/ 
monitoring (rfmon) mode, 
and (with appropriate 
hardware) can sniff 802.11b, 
802.11a, 802.11g, and 
802.11n traffic. Kismet also 
supports plugins which allow 
sniffing other media. 
 
http://www.kismetwireless.n
et/download.shtml 
Wfuzz [19] 
Wfuzz is a tool for 
brute forcing Web 
Applications, it can be 
used for finding 
resources not linked 
(directories, servlets, 
scripts, etc), 
bruteforcing GET and 
POST parameters for 
different kinds of 
injections (SQL, XSS, 
LDAP, etc.), 
bruteforcing form 
parameters 
(user/password), 
fuzzing, and more. 
 
http://www.edge-
security.com/wfuzz.php 
http://code.google.com/
p/wfuzz/downloads/list 
 
Aircrack 
Aircrack is a suite of tools 
for 802.11a/b/g WEP and 
WPA cracking. It 
implements the best known 
cracking algorithms to 
recover wireless keys once 
enough encrypted packets 
have been gathered. The 
suite comprises over a dozen 
discrete tools, including 
airodump (an 802.11 packet 
capture program), aireplay 
(an 802.11 packet injection 
program), aircrack (static 
WEP and WPA-PSK 
cracking), and airdecap 
(decrypts WEP/WPA 
capture files). 
 
http://www.aircrack-ng.org/   
 Wfuzz 
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MSSQL Brutter (Fast-
Track) 
MSSQL Bruter is a 
Fast-track tool that tries 
to identify SQL servers 
with weak "sa" 
passwords in order to 
inject payloads into the 
system. The tool 
implements this task by 
brute forcing the SQL 
server password. 
http://www.offensiv
e-
security.com/metas
ploit-
unleashed/MSSQL_B
ruter 
UCSniff 
UCSniff is a VoIP & IP 
Video Security Assessment 
tool that integrates existing 
open source software into 
several useful features, 
allowing VoIP and IP Video 
owners and security 
professionals to rapidly test 
for the threat of unauthorized 
VoIP and Video 
Eavesdropping. UCSniff 
supports Arp poisoning, 
VLAN Hopping, VLAN 
Discovery via CDP, it has a 
sniffer capabilities and more. 
UCSniff can operate in 2 
modes: 
1) Monitor mode – Should 
be used on a shared media 
where the IP phones 
connected to i.e. a HUB, 
wireless access point, it can 
be also be used in a switched 
environment by setting up a 
SPAN sessions on a Cisco 
switch. 
2) Man in the middle mode – 
This mode has 2 additional 
modes which are 
 Learning Mode 
 Targeted Mode  
http://sourceforge.net/project
s/ucsniff/files/  
 Skipfish [20] 
 
 
Skipfish is an active web 
application security 
reconnaissance tool. It 
prepares an interactive 
sitemap for the targeted site 
by carrying out a recursive 
crawl and dictionary-based 
probes. The resulting map is 
then annotated with the 
output from a number of 
active (but hopefully non-
disruptive) security checks. 
The final report generated by 
the tool is meant to serve as 
a foundation for professional 
web application security 
assessments. 
Source: 
http://code.google.com/p/ski
pfish/  
 
SQL Pawnage (Fast-
Track) 
Scans SQL web 
applications for 
vulnerabilities. 
Source:http://www.offe
nsive-
security.com/metasploit
-unleashed/ 
  SQL Pawnage 
MSSQL Injection 
(Fast-Track) 
A tool that uses SQL 
techniques in order to 
ultimately gain full 
unrestricted access to 
the underlying system. 
http://www.offensivese
curity.com/metasploit-
unleashed/  
   
Table 1-2 Open Source Tools Survey 
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From the open source survey table above, we can infer the best choice tools 
for the open source toolkit would be: 
 
 OpenVas 4: A vulnerability analysis tool that can scan multiple targets 
concurrently with its supported 20,000 vulnerability test. In addition, the tool 
consolidates many tools into its scanner (i.e. Nikto, Nmap, and w3af), 
expanding its reporting capabilities. [10] 
 
 Kismet: A wireless network detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection system 
that can sniff 802.11b, 802.11a, 802.11g, and 802.11n traffic. Kismet works 
by passively collecting packets; which can lead to detecting hidden networks 
over time. [11] 
 
 Aircrack: A tool designed to assess the security of a wireless network using 
various WEP and WPA cracking algorithms. Once this tool has captured 
enough packets from a wireless network, it can begin analyzing those packets 
and try to break the wireless network’s encryption methods [12]. 
 
 UCSniff: An application to rapidly test for the threat of unauthorized VoIP and 
Video Eavesdropping. This tool was developed for current and next 
generation VOIP infrastructures, so it will aid healthcare entities keep their 
HIS HIPAA compliant. [13] 
 
 SQLMAP: A tool designed to automate the process of detecting and exploiting 
SQL injection flaws and taking over database servers. Not only can the tool 
fingerprint databases and fetch data from them, but it can also be used to 
execute command on the operating system.  [14] 
 
 Fast-Track: An automated penetration suite designed to scan and penetrate 
databases, networks, infrastructure, and applications of an information 
system's network. Some of its various tools include the Nmap scripting 
engine, SQL Pawnage, and MSSQL injection. [15] 
 
 Wapiti: A tool designed to audit the security of web applications through 
'black-box' scans looking for scripts and forms where it can inject data. Some 
of its capabilities include Cross Site Scripting injection, LDAP injections, and 
file handling errors. [16] 
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These tools working cohesively, in a toolkit, will address the concerns of 
developing a toolkit that will be comprehensive enough to ensure a Health 
Information System (HIS) stays HIPAA compliant. 
 
4. Risk Assessment Framework  
The purpose of this section is to offer a framework for describing how the 
assessment engine (the derrived tool set) interacts with our data set (a replica 
healthcare information system).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Risk Assessment Framework for a HIS 
 
The framework is illustrated in figure 1.  After the assessment engines have 
received data from the HIS components, it pipes their data to the master 
assessment engine. Here at the master assessment engine, an analysis and 
detection engine analyzes the data to detect anomalies and vulnerabilities within 
the HIS. Once the analysis is complete and there are vulnerabilities detected, it 
will send its analysis to the mitigation engine. The mitigation engine then 
develops mitigation strategies from the analysis and sends its recommendations 
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back to the assessment engine. Finally, the assessment engine presents 
assessments to the user in the form of reports. 
 
5. Experimental Setup 
 
The environment we chose to implement our open source tool set was Backtrack 
5 configured as a Virtual Machine (VM). We chose this environment simply 
because six of the seven tools were already installed in this Linux operating 
system. Once we configured the VM, we installed Nessus HomeFeed (version 5). 
In this way any custom scan polices will serve as the baseline for testing our open 
source solution. Afterwards, when we completed and tested our open source tool 
set, we could then compare the results with the Nessus Homefeed results. 
Additionally, to develop the open source tool set, we subdivided the HIS domain 
into 4 areas. The tool set focuses on the 1) network, 2) databases, 3) applications, 
and 4) infrastructure of a HIS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Assessment Engine 
 
In the following 4 subsections, the paper discusses how each open source tool 
surveyed will enable the derived toolkit to achieve its objective. Together, these 
tools integrated into a toolkit have the potential to provide comprehensive, 
automated assessments for any healthcare organization. 
 
 Network: In order to ensure the toolkit was comprehensive enough to provide 
detailed network assessments, four tools were selected to determine the 
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associated risk of exploitation to a HIS’s network. The first tool, OpenVAS 4, 
is a network scanner that audits network host and list the vulnerabilities and 
common misconfigurations that affect the host. The second tool Kismet, is a 
tool that was selected based on its capabilities to detect and sniff out wireless 
networks. However, the tool did not provide Wireless network penetration 
testing; Therefore, Aircrack was needed to deliver WEP and WPA penetration 
testing. Lastly, the toolkit needed to test for unauthorized VOIP 
eavesdropping. To provide this type of assessment, UCSniff was preferred as 
it can quickly test for unauthorized VOIP eavesdropping.  
 
 Database: To assess the security of a HIS’s database, two tools were chosen, 
SQLMap and Fast-Track. Both tools provide penetration testing against 
databases. However, each tool excelled at one area of database scanning and 
penetration testing whereas the other tool excelled in another area of database 
scanning and penetration testing. First, SQLMAP excels at fingerprinting a 
database, a feature that Fast-Track lacks. The tool can also be a means of 
taking over back-end database servers and even access the underlying OS. On 
the other hand, Fast-track is an automated penetration suite that uses 
Metasploit to enhance its library of attacks against a given database. By 
pipelining the fingerprinting results of SQLMap into Fast-Track, we can fully 
assess the security of a database.  
 
 Applications: The tool chosen to scan for web applications within a HIS was 
Wapiti. This tool was chosen because it is able to detect the most vulnerability 
(i.e. Cross-Site Scripting, LDAP injection) and act like a fuzzer to inject 
payloads to see if scripts within web applications are vulnerable.  
 
 Infrastructure: To assess the configuration reviews of the servers and desktop 
host on a HIS, there was only one open source option available - OpenVAS 4. 
Using server configuration reviews from the scan, we can pipeline the results 
into Fast-Track and create automated penetration test against a HIS.     
 
Figure 2 illustrates the synergy of the tools chosen to be integrated into the 
tool set. Together, these tools make up the framework for the assessment engine. 
As one can see, the tools within the tool set are in constant communication with 
the apparatuses of the HIS. If the assessment engine detects malicious activity 
within the HIS, it will signal the apparatus of the HIS to send data back to it at 
shorter time intervals.  
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6. Evaluation and Inferences
 
Dataset: As hinted throughout this paper, 
health data. The data is both real world and emulated data set from Google health 
data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
our data set will consist of electronic 
Figure 3: Google Health Record 
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Generally speaking, a personal health record contains physical and/or mental 
information about a patient. To illustrate an electronic personal health record, 
figure 3 is a sample electronic Google personal health record from Google’s 
healthcare service [17]. This service allowed individuals to create a profile 
derived from their individual health records so that they can see the risk and 
benefits of the current treatment they are receiving. In this record, we see 
individual identifiable information such as the patient’s name, date of birth, 
ethnicity, and blood type (information that needs to be protected in order to 
prevent unlawful disclosures). In addition, there are five additional fields (along 
with their attributes) within the record. The first field, the Wellness field, contains 
the patient’s height and weight. The second field, the Problems field, holds 
information related to illnesses the patient has been diagnosed with to date. The 
third field, the Allergies field, lists the patient’s allergies. The next field, the 
Procedures field, details the procedures the patient has undergone. Finally, the 
last field, the Immunizations field, lists the immunizations the patient has 
received. By the same token, we will test our data on real world electronic health 
record data from a HIMMS healthcare organization.  
 
In addition to EHRs, the other major data set used in our research will be the 
firewall. More specifically, the configuration of the firewall is important because 
it is the first line of defense against hackers. To clarify, the firewall sits between 
the Internet and internal healthcare information system, and its main job is to filter 
connections based on policies set by the administrators. If a connection is allowed 
by the policy, the firewall will allow the connection into the internal HIS, If not 
(because of security reasons), then the firewall will drop the connection. Figure 4 
illustrates a firewall policy created by an IT professional. In general, a firewall 
policy rule works by analyzing the source of an incoming connection, the 
destination of the incoming connection, and the type of service running on that 
connection. Once the firewall has this information, it checks the information 
against the rules set forth by the administrator. If the connection meets the 
requirements, then it is allowed into the firewall. If not, then the connection is 
denied. As an example, we can take a look at the first row of the firewall 
configuration policy illustration.  The host 104.4.51.22 is allowed to make a 
samba connection to host 10.0.3.78. Likewise, the firewall uses this same process 
to deny connections. 
 
  
16
Colonial Academic Alliance Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 4 [2015], Art. 6
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol4/iss1/6
  
 
 
Source Destination Protocol Action 
104.4.51.22 10.0.3.78 Samba Allow 
206.8.7.88 10.0.3.33 Ssh Allow 
194.3.6.2 10.0.3.45 ldap Deny 
98.5.7.1 10.0.3.91 dns Allow 
23.1.5.87 10.0.3.178 ntp Deny 
 
Figure 4: Firewall Configuration Policy 
 
Results: Real world HIMSS 6 Healthcare Dataset:  
 
Our results are based on emulated assessments of a HIS network and an EHR 
database. More specifically, The EHR database we are assessing contains 20,000 
electronic medical records (EMR) from the HIMMS 6 Healthcare practice.   
 
 
Figure 5: HIMMS 7 EMR Assessment 
 
Once we finished assessing the network and EMR database, we divided our 
results into two categories: privacy vulnerabilities and security vulnerabilities. 
Then we compared the vulnerabilities detected by the derived tool set against the 
actual number of vulnerabilities in the HIS.  For example, there are five actual 
vulnerabilities in a HIS we are assessing.  Our tool set only detected four 
vulnerabilities; therefore, our tool set was 80% effective. If the tool set detected 
all five then it is 100% effective. If the tool set detected all five vulnerabilities 
plus one, then the tool set detected a false positive. In this case, we will disregard 
all false positives since our results only reflect true positives.  In Figure 5, we see 
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the HIMMS 6 EMR assessment. There were a total of four assessments to detect 
vulnerabilities against the Privacy Rule, and four assessments to assess the 
vulnerabilities against the Security Rule. Once we completed the four assessments 
within each category, we calculated the averages to find the success rate of the 
tool set. The average success rate for detecting security vulnerabilities against the 
EMR database was 96%. The average success rate for detecting privacy 
vulnerabilities against the EMR database was 98%. In Figure 6, we present our 
HIMMS 6 network assessment results. The average success rate of security 
vulnerabilities detected by the tool set was 98.75%. In addition, the average 
percentage of privacy vulnerabilities detected by the tool set was 98.50%.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: HIMMS 7 Network Assessment 
 
Results: Emulated Google Health Dataset:  
 
Our results are based on assessments of a D-Link DIR-655 Xtreme N Gigabit 
Router (IP address 10.0.0.1), and an ASP.NET web application database (IP 
address 10.0.0.60). More specifically, the database records we are assessing 
contain sample information about movies. Additionally, once we finished 
assessing the network and database, we compared our results to the Nessus 
baseline scans. We found the baseline scans for the D-link router (IP address 
10.0.01) found 2 vulnerabilities rated high risk on UDP port 2003, one 
vulnerability rated medium risk on UDP port 53, and 23 vulnerabilities rated as 
low risk. The derived assessment scan detected one high risk vulnerability, one 
medium risk, and 12 vulnerabilities rated low risk. Analyzing and comparing 
these results, we see the toolkit did not detect the two high risk vulnerabilities 
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found in the baseline scans, but it did detect a high risk vulnerability related to 
SMNP Agent responding to community names, and one medium risk 
vulnerability related to denial of service attacks against TCP services. However, 
the medium risk vulnerability detected by the derived toolkit was not the same 
medium risk vulnerability detected by the baseline assessment. 
 
For the host (IP 10.0.0.60) running the ASP.NET application, we found that 
the results were very interesting. The baseline assessment detected three medium 
risk vulnerabilities. When we examine the medium risk vulnerabilities further, we 
find two medium risk vulnerabilities are associated with the web server certificate 
being a self-signed certificate. The X.509 certificate should be signed from a 
known trusted public authority. This becomes a concern if the web server was 
actually placed on the Internet, then an attacker could initiate a man in the middle 
attack by breaking the chain of certificates on the server. The other medium risk 
vulnerability found was due to SMB signaling being disabled. This vulnerability 
could be exploited through a man-in-the-middle attack against the SMB server. In 
comparison, the derived assessment toolkit did not detect the three vulnerabilities 
the baseline assessment scan detected. The toolkit found two high risk 
vulnerabilities in the ASP.NET web application. One high risk vulnerability 
detected was because of a SQL 5.x Unspecified Buffer overflow vulnerability.  
This was due to the fact that the ASP.NET application did not perform boundary 
checks on user supplied data. According to the data logs, failed exploits can cause 
a denial of service on the database. The second high risk vulnerability found was 
for a MySQL Multiple Vulnerabilities vulnerability. This could be the direct result 
of the buffer overflow detected by the other high risk. As one can see the two 
assessments contrast greatly. Upon further research, we found that the baseline 
assessment software needs a plugin license to detect vulnerabilities within 
databases. The detailed screenshots are in Appendix A.  
 
7. Log Analysis and Mitigating Strategies 
 
Log Analysis Detection: 
 
Because of the ever changing environment electronic information systems are 
being utilized in, continuous assessments and adjustments are needed to keep 
those systems secured and compliant with regulatory laws. This is very true in 
terms of healthcare information systems. In order to provide mitigation to the 
vulnerabilities found during scans, we will conduct a review of the logs recorded 
during assessments. For this we will use four techniques to review the logs.  
 
19
Acharya et al.: A Comprehensive Security Assessment Toolkit for HealthCare Systems
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2015
  
 
 
 Knowledge based: A technique where the log assessment engine will be 
conducting an analysis on the tool set assessment data by comparing it to a 
stored knowledge base (a file containing the baseline assessment scans of a 
HIS undergoing HIPAA compliance testing) within its engine. It will then 
send its analysis to the mitigation engine for recommendations.    
 
 Anomaly based: A technique that involves comparing the results from the tool 
set assessment data with previously recorded assessment data of the HIS. 
From this comparison, this analysis will detect anomalies (e.g. a host is 
scanning the network searching for vulnerable host, a host is scanning ports of 
other host to find what services are running on them, host attacking another 
host) found within the HIS and send its analysis to the mitigation engine. 
From these analyses the mitigation engine will provide a means to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities found.   
 
 Reputation based: This technique involves analyzing the behavior of each 
component of an HIS to determine the trustworthiness within the domain of 
the HIS. To determine the trustworthiness of a host, the analysis and detection 
engine will form its own opinion about the host in question, and incorporate 
how other host’s view it’s trustworthiness to form a selected host’s reputation.  
 
 Hybrid Based The hybrid technique embraces the previous three techniques 
processes for forming analysis on a host. Once it has finished its analysis, it 
sends the analysis to the mitigation engine. Because of this technique’s 
complexity, it requires more time and resources then the previous techniques. 
 
Mitigating Strategies  
 
To illustrate how mitigation strategies work, we will use the example of an 
unencrypted database found within a HIS by our tool set. In this scenario, the 
analysis and detection engine has reviewed the logs and discovered the tool set 1) 
successfully exploited a database containing EHRs, and 2) the toolkit can search 
through the database without limitations. Since the EHRs on the database are 
unencrypted, any hacker would be able to exploit the data. The analysis and 
detection assessment engine would identify this vulnerability and send its analysis 
to the mitigation engine. The mitigation engine would then recommend using a 
data encryption solution such that even though the hacker is able to gain access to 
the data, it is not able to view the encrypted information without possessing the 
correct decryption keys. One such encryption solution is the open source 
framework Charm-Crypto [18]. Charm is a framework for rapidly prototyping 
advanced cryptosystems. Its library includes public key encryption schemes, 
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identity-based encryption schemes, attribute-based encryption schemes, digital 
signatures, privacy-preserving signatures, commitment schemes, zero-knowledge 
proofs, and interactive protocols such as anonymous credential and oblivious 
transfer schemes. To conclude, once the tool set has assessed a HIS, we can begin 
to provide solutions to mitigate the vulnerabilities. 
 
We reviewed the logs, and provided mitigation strategies to address the high 
and medium risk vulnerabilities that we detected. Our mitigation strategies were 
based on recommendation from online sources such as us-cert.gov, and 
owasp.org. First, examining the router of the network (IP address 10.0.0.1), the 2 
high risk vulnerabilities associated with the D-link daemon, it is recommended 
that one implement authentication methods to mitigate the Click ‘n Connect 
daemon to disallow attackers from gaining control of server functions via the D-
link Daemon. Secondly, for the 1 medium risk vulnerability found on the router 
from DNS snooping attacks on the router, we recommend re-configuring of the 
DNS to stop this kind of snooping activity. When we took a look at the 1 medium 
risk from the derived assessment toolkit results, the TCP Sequence Number 
Approximation Reset Denial of Service Vulnerability, we found that it is 
recommended that one either implement IPSec (IP Security) to encrypt traffic and 
obscure TCP information available to the attacker, implement ingress and egress 
filtering to expected addresses, or implement TCP MD5 signature option to verify 
and checksum TCP packet carrying BGP data. Finally, regarding the host hosting 
the ASP.NET application, the 2 high risk vulnerabilities (buffer overflow), we 
recommend implementing Integrating boundary checking in the test application. 
 
8. Conclusions and Future Research Directions  
In conclusion, our research achieves the task of fully assessing a healthcare 
information system domain. We accomplished this by first comprehensively 
assessing the databases, networks, applications, and infrastructure within the HIS 
domain, and then automating the comprehensiveness assessments to ensure time 
and resource efficiency. Furthermore, automating the comprehensive assessment 
ensures no steps would be skipped and that the assessment of the HIS is HIPAA 
compliant. Finally, in order for a healthcare entity to maintain its HIPAA 
compliance, we see the mitigation engine recommending solutions based on the 
data it receives from the analysis and detection engine. Our research was useful in 
that it exposed the issues facing the healthcare industry not widely publicized and 
makes us think about the entirety of the information healthcare entities possess 
that are not entirely secure within their domain. As future research we would like 
to test our proposed toolkit on different real world data sets. Additionally, one 
can use different EHR formats to test the assessment engine against.  Also, we 
21
Acharya et al.: A Comprehensive Security Assessment Toolkit for HealthCare Systems
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2015
  
 
 
would like to develop additional mitigation strategies to ensure security of EHRs 
in storage, access and transmission. These efforts will in turn enable the 
maintenance of compliance in the HIS. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 1: Configuring the Database Assessment Scanner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2: Configuring the Infrastructure Scans 
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Appendix Figure 3: Configuring the Network Scans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 4: Configuring the Web Application Scans 
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Appendix Figure 5: Baseline Assessment of 10.0.0.0 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6: Overview Baseline Assessment of 10.0.0.1 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7: Toolkit Assessment Results of 10.0.0.1 
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Appendix Figure 8: Overview Baseline Assessment of 10.0.0.60 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 9: Toolkit Assessment Results of 10.0.0.1  
(High Risk Vulnerabilities) 
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